

PQWAVE-MHT: Post-Quantum secure WAVE protocol based on Merkle Hash Tree for secure V2X communication

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Abstract. Autonomous cars now share information with the other systems outside of them in a V2X communication. V2X protocol, Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment(WAVE), authenticates parties based on Signatures using the ECDSA-P256(IEEE 1609.2 Standard). In this paper, we conduct research on applying Post Quantum Cryptography(PQC) to the WAVE to prevent security threats caused by the development of quantum computing systems. We proposed PQC-WAVE applying Merkle Hash Tree (PQWAVE-MHT) which is designed as a framework to reduce the computational load of signing and verification required to authenticate basic security messages (BSMs) transmitted in WAVE protocol in real-time. We integrated the proposed PQWAVE-MHT into the V2Verifier which is a well-known V2X simulator and measured the signing and verification performance. As a result, about 82% and 74% of performance improvement were achieved for signing and verification, respectively.

Keywords: V2X · Post-Quantum Cryptography · WAVE · IEEE 1609.2 · Merkle Hash Tree · Digital Signature Algorithm

1 Introduction

Vehicular technology is evolving into connected cars that can communicate with other systems outside of the vehicle. In a Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) network, a vehicle participates as a node. V2X is classified into Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle-to-Network (V2N), etc. depending on what the vehicles communicate with. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) [1], V2X technology is expected to improve overall traffic safety by preventing 439,000 ~ 615,000 accidents and reducing damage by 987 people. Additionally, according to a report by the European Commission (EC) [2], V2X has advantages such as reduced travel time, improved efficiency, reduced accident rate, and reduced fuel consumption. Vehicles with full automation capability in a V2X communication transmit Basic Safety Message (BSM) in order to exchange traffic-related information such as their location information, speed, and emergency safety. Thus, V2X may be subject to malicious threats such as fake BSMs or Maliciously modified BSMs. To prevent

these attacks, vehicles need to verify whether the received BSMs are correct and authenticated or not.

To ensure stable V2X communication, various organizations including IEEE and 3GPP have established standards of latency, message transmission reliability, and maximum packet size. To date, it has been decided that IEEE standards-based The Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment **WAVE** and 3GPP-based 5G-V2X will be studied concurrently, utilizing separate channels (5.9 GHz frequency band [3]). In this paper, we conducted research based on the IEEE standard WAVE protocol, which provides more limited definitions of maximum packet size compared to 5G-V2X. (WAVE) protocol uses IEEE 1609.2 as an underlying security standard, which defines the authentication method **BSMs**. According to IEEE 1609.2, BSMs are Signed by ECDSA-P256 algorithm for authenticating them. In other words, a BSM additionally conveys digital signature and signer's public key or certificate. Upon receiving a BSM, the vehicle checks the authenticity of the message by verifying the certificate signature. This process verifies whether the BSM has been generated by the claimed sending party and the integrity of the message.

Motivation The advancement in quantum computers poses a threat to the widely used Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) in various application protocols, not just in V2X protocols. Due to the Shor algorithm [4], ECDSA can be broken in polynomial time. Consequently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a competition on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and selected two lattice-based algorithms (Dilithium [5] and Falcon [6]) and one hash-based algorithm (SPHINCS+ [7]) for digital signature algorithms. Initially, research on PQC migration was actively conducted, starting with TLS/SSL and SSH [8, 9]. The necessity for research on V2X protocol migration is undeniable, and recently, a PQC benchmarking study in a V2X environment was undertaken in [10]. As pointed out in [10], there are limitations to embedding both Dilithium and SPHINCS+ in the WAVE protocol based on the IEEE 1609.2 standard. In the V2V environment, where signatures must be generated at least every 100 ms, the signature generation process of Falcon is not suitable in terms of speed. Moreover, compared to the previously used Elliptic Curve-based ECDSA, PQC algorithms incur more computational overhead when generating and verifying digital signatures. On-Board Units (OBUs) in vehicles, which need to process operations in real-time, typically have more limited resources than general computers, underscoring the need for research to reduce computational overhead. Therefore, this study discusses a method to migrate PQC-DSA to fit the IEEE 1609.2 standard of the WAVE protocol and proposes an authentication framework to alleviate computational load in OBUs. The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:

Contribution : In this paper, we overcome the limitations of PQC migration by proposing an authentication framework tailored for the V2V environment. Initially, to accelerate the signature generation/verification while adhering to the maximum packet size grounded in the IEEE 1609.2 standard, we introduce the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT). Furthermore, we bring forth the concept of weak authentication, authenticating with a hash function before proceeding to the PQC signature verification process. This negates the need for the signature generation process for every packet, while also streamlining the verification process. We consider various scenarios to assess the feasibility of implementing MHT. Taking into account packet transmission order in a broadcasting environment, BSMs, and the size of the MHT tree, we suggest an optimal framework fit PQWAVE-MHT for the V2V setting. Ultimately, we validate the efficiency of our framework by benchmarking the performance during Sign and Verify operations in V2Verifier which is a well-known V2X simulator. Within V2Verifier, for Falcon-512, PQWAVE-MHT demonstrates performance enhancements of 82% in Sign and 74 % in Verify. Likewise, for Falcon-1024, we observe improvements of 81 % and 73 % in Sign and Verify, respectively.

2 Preliminary

2.1 V2X standard

Various standards need to be considered when migrating PQC-DSA to the WAVE protocol. In particular, this study focuses on IEEE 802.11p, a 2016 amendment that standardizes vehicle communication systems, and IEEE 1609.2, which is a security standard for establishing application layers. Vehicles that utilize the WAVE protocol authenticate communication parties, including Roadside Units (RSUs), within their communication radius, using Certificate-based and Digital Signature methods, for the exchange of traffic data. Table 1 shows that the IEEE standard for the WAVE protocol offers a more restricted Quality of Service (QoS) compared to 3GPP. According to the standard, the WAVE protocol is required to transmit Secure Protocol Data Units (SPDUs) that concatenate headers, Basic Safety Messages (BSMs), and Signatures within 2000 bytes, with a delay ranging from 50 ms to 100 ms.

2.2 Migration to Post Quantum Cryptography

NIST has been overseeing the standardization work in PQC algorithms. In Round 4, held on June 3, 2022, NIST selected one scheme for Key Encapsulation Mechanism (Crystals-Kyber) and three schemes for Digital Signature Algorithms (Crystals-Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+). Table 2 shows the primitive, public key, and signature size of each algorithm. The Signature size of the PQC-DSAs at security level 1 is much longer than the 32 bytes Signature size defined in [11] for ECDSA-P256.

Table 1: QoS requirement for V2X communication

Protocol	WAVE	C-V2X	eC-V2X	5G-V2X
Processing Rate	3 ~ 27 Mbps	10 ~ 100 (Maximum 1000) Mbps		Maximum 2000 Mbps
Payload	2000 bytes	400 (Ad : 12,000) bytes		P1 : 6 Kbytes Ad : 12 Kbytes Au : 42 Kbytes
Maximum Communication Radius	1,000 m	320 m	1,000 m	P1 : 350 m Ad : 700 m Au : 1,000 m
Latency	100 ms		100 (P1 : 10) ms	P1 : 25 ms Ad : 100 ms Au : 5 ms
Vehicle Maximum Relative speed	200 km/h	280 km/h		500 km/h
Reliability	90 ~ 95 %	80 ~ 95 %		90 ~ 100 %

P1 : platooning driving, Ad : Advanced driving, Au : Autonomous driving

This paper primarily concentrates on evaluating the performance of Falcon at security level 1, 5 which meets the 2,000 bytes payload size standard required by the WAVE protocol. However, the IEEE, WAVE standard, should be expanded in preparation for PQC migration [12]. Additionally, it is evident from prior PQC migration research [10] that Dilithium's Signature generation and verification processes are faster than Falcon's. SPHINCS+ was not measured, but as shown in [13], Sign and Verify achieved noticeably slower performance compared to the other two PQC-DSAs. The WAVE protocol mandates real-time verification of signatures of parties within a 1km communication radius, according to IEEE standards. Additionally, vehicles should broadcast their traffic data, including signature, at intervals of up to 100 ms. This is a very important part of V2X communication, which processes data in milliseconds. Reducing communication and computing overhead will prevent accidents and improve road safety.

2.3 Performance Evaluation in the V2Verifier

We evaluate the performance of PQC-WAVE applying Merkle Hash Tree(PQWAVE-MHT) and compare it with the performance of simply porting PQC-DSA to the WAVE protocol. The performance is measured using the V2Verifier which is a well-known

Table 2: Parameters of PQC-DSA

Scheme (Primitive)	Dilithium (Module-LWE)			Falcon (NTRU)			SPHINCS+ (Hash function)		
parameters* (Security level)	<i>pk</i>	<i>sk</i>	<i>sig</i>	<i>pk</i>	<i>sk</i>	<i>sig</i>	<i>pk</i>	<i>sk</i>	<i>sig</i>
(1)	-	-	-	897	1,281	690	32	64	7,856
(2)	1,312	2,528	2,420	-	-	-	-	-	-
(3)	1,952	4,000	3,293	-	-	-	48	96	16,224
(5)	2,592	4,864	4,595	1,793	2,305	1,330	64	128	29,792

*The notation units for *pk*, *sk*, and *sig* are bytes

V2X simulator. Unfortunately, we were unable to use HW Universal Software Radio Peripheral(USRP), the original V2Verifier test equipment, in this research. V2Verifier can measure the time it takes to **Sign** and **Verify** signatures transmitted to and from a vehicle. **WAVE** protocol, which has a Signature-based authentication system, should repeatedly perform PQC operations (Sign and Verify) on **BSMs** generated in real-time in the vehicle. We experimented with the PQC-DSA algorithm Falcon, which complies with the maximum payload size specified in IEEE 1609.2 (2).

1330 bytes (signature of Falcon (security level 5)) < 2000 bytes(IEEE Standard) (2)

3 PQWAVE-MHT

3.1 Assumptions

In this paper, we propose PQWAVE-MHT, a **WAVE** protocol that migrates PQC-DSA by applying Merkle Hash Tree, accelerating the computational load during Sign and Verify. We measure the **Sign** and **Verify** performance using PQWAVE-MHT for V2V, a Peer-to-Peer link. To measure performance in V2Verifier, this experiment is based on several assumptions:

1. The local vehicles broadcast their public key to the RSU in the **WAVE** communication radius. As a result, we do not measure the performance of key generation and Certificate verification, assuming that the remote vehicle has already been received. Merkle Hash Tree-based authentication can also be applied for RSU, which can be shown [14].
2. This experiment solely focuses on comparing the performance between simple migration PQC-WAVE and Merkle Hash Tree-based. A comprehensive interpretation of the results is presented in Section 5.

Table 3: Notation and Description

Notation	Description
BSM	Basic Safety Message
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
MHT	Merkle Hash Tree
MHV	Missing Hash Values of MHT
OBV	On-Board-Unit
RSU	Roadside-Unit
SPDU	Secure Protocol Data Unit
WAVE	Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment
ID-H	PSID MHT Internal Index Number of the packet h_r
Sign	signature generation process of Falcon
Verify	Falcon verifying algorithm
PQWAVE-MHT	PQC migrated WAVE protocol using Merkle Hash Tree
QoS	Quality of Service
pk_{remote}, sk_{remote}	Public and Private keys of remote car
pk_{local}, sk_{local}	Public and Private keys of local car
$Sign(BSM_i, sk)$	Generate BSM_i 's signature using sk
$Verify(BSM_i, pk)$	Verify BSM_i 's signature using pk
$H(m)$	for m , generating digest using SHA-256 hash function
h_i	$H(BSM_i)$
h_k	$k = nm, H(H(BSM_n) H(BSM_m))$
h_r	Root hash packet in MHT

3. PQWAVE-MHT incorporates a logic designed to address threat models, such as DoS attacks like seluge, using Merkle Hash trees [15], as it does not rely on hardware equipment like USRP.
4. The Notation used to describe the framework of PQWAVE-MHT are defined in Table 3.

3.2 Authentication Framework using Merkle hash tree

PQWAVE-MHT which is migrated to Falcon, a PQC-DSA that complies with 2000 bytes defined in the WAVE protocol standard IEEE 1609.2. Digital Signatures using Falcon impose a real-time computational overhead in V2V communication and are slower processes compared to other DSAs, including ECDSA [10]. The PQWAVE-MHT proposed here utilizes the Merkle Hash Tree structure in **Sign** and **Verify** operations to alleviate the computational overhead that could otherwise burden a wireless network with more cost-effective operations.




Fig. 1: Comparison of signature generation between the original case and our proposal using Merkle Hash Tree

Fig. 1 shows a local OBU using Merkle Hash Tree before transmitting the SPDU generated during driving. The vehicle on the left generates a Signature using only DSA, and the vehicle on the right generates a Signature using Merkle Hash Tree. The structure of MHV is $h_j || h_k || h_r || \text{Signature}$ as shown in Fig. 1 and its size is 96 bytes excluding the Signature. The logic for MHV generation and Verify is explained alongside [Algorithm 1], which will be introduced below. PQWAVE-MHT was performed using 4 BSMs as the most basic Tree configuration. When using HW equipment such as USRP, Tree configuration can be optimized to comply with the latency standards of IEEE 802.11p. Finally, the BSMs to which the MHV is concatenated are broadcast to parties within communication radius. PQWAVE-MHT replaces the 4 Signature operations for the existing 4 BSMs with 1 Signature operation and SHA-256 operation. The computational load of Falcon, the migration target PQC-DSA, is as follows (1).

$$4 \text{ Falcon} - > 1 \text{ Falcon} + 7 \text{ SHA-256.} \quad (1)$$

The V2Verifier measures the Latency at which local vehicles **Sign** and **verify** signatures according to [Algorithm 1]. PQWAVE-MHT filters and verifies vehicles within the WAVE protocol radius based on PSID. PQWAVE-MHT prevents computational overhead and communication failures by replacing PSID and Falcon with SHA-256, a more cost-effective operation. The Framework, which measures performance on a simulator, focuses on computational speed when **Sign** and **Verify** Signatures without taking into account noise or external attacks. SPDU is broadcast in the form of MHV concatenated with BSM, incorporating timestamp and PSID log to respond to replay attacks, and uses weak authentication prior to Falcon operation. $||$ means for Concatenate, $H(x)$ is SHA-256 operation on x , and $\text{Sign}(x, sk)$ is the operation that Signs for x using the private key sk .

Algorithm 1 Authentication of 4 BSMs from V_A to V_B based on PQWAVE-MHT.

Sender A do:

- 1: configures each BSM_i , ($i \in [0, 3]$) and generates $h_i \leftarrow H(BSM_i)$
- 2: generates $sig \leftarrow \text{Sign}(h_r, sk_A)$, where $h_r \leftarrow H(H(h_0||h_1)||H(h_2||h_3))$
- 3: combines MHV with BSM
 - ▷ MHV : $h_j||h_k||h_r$, $k=nm$, and $h_k \leftarrow H(h_n||h_m)$
 - ▷ broadcasting and **B** received

Receiver B do:

- 4: checks timestamp of $SPDU$ ▷ prevant replay attacks
 - 5: **if** invalid timestamp **then**
 - 6: **return** fail
 - 7: **else**
 - 8: retrieves PSID in logged ID-H ▷ weak authentication
 - 9: **if** ID-H is not stored **then**
 - 10: $t \leftarrow H(H(H(BSM_i)||h_j)||h_k)$ ▷ if $i \leq 1, j \in \{0, 1\} \setminus \{i\}$ and $k = 23$
 - 11: **if** $t \neq h_r$ **then** ▷ if $i \geq 2, j \in \{2, 3\} \setminus \{i\}$ and $k = 01$
 - 12: **return** fail
 - 13: **else**
 - 14: $flag \leftarrow \text{Verify}(sig, pk_A)$ ▷ verify signature
 - 15: **if** $flag \neq \text{success}$ **then**
 - 16: **return** fail
 - 17: BSM_i : authenticated
 - 18: stores BSM_i to ID-H
 - ▷ ID-H : PSID||MHT internal Index Number of packet|| h_r
 - 19: $t \leftarrow H(H(H(BSM_i)||h_j)||h_k)$
 - 20: **if** $t \neq h_r$ **then**
 - 21: **return** fail
 - 22: **else**
 - 23: BSM_i : authenticated
 - 24: **return** Success
-

As demonstrated in **Sender A do:** line 3, the advantage of Merkle Hash Tree is that faster **Verify** is possible if there is a specific value required in the Tree structure. In the MHT structure, only 2 source parameters and 3 SHA-256 operations are required to create the Root Hash value, which is a parameter for creating a Signature using Falcon operation without transmitting all values. Line 10 of **Receiver B do** represents a key operation within PQWAVE-MHT. BSM_i refers to the BSM subject to verification, and h_j and h_k are values required for **Verify** in the Merkle Hash Tree structure. For example, if i is 0, BSM_0 is hashing($H()$) and $H(BSM_0)$ is concatenated with H_j , which is the $H(BSM_1)$ received through MHV. Afterward, h_{01} is concatenated with h_{23} which is $H(H(h_2)||H(h_3))$ received from MHV. Finally, we obtain h_r , which is the input value of Falcon-based **Sign** and the value used for MHT **Verify**.

In the overall authentication framework, PQWAVE-MHT verifies whether the first received BSM has previously completed a valid Falcon-based verification. If there is an **ID-H** logged with that PSID and value, the h_r value is compared to complete the verification.

4 Analysis

Fig. 2 shows the Latency of **Sign** and **Verify** for two versions of the WAVE protocol with a migration of PQC. The protocol framework is PQC-WAVE, which only performs simple migration, and PQWAVE-MHT, which applies Merkle Hash Tree to the PQC-WAVE protocol. The platform used for simulating V2Verifier is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8700 CPU 3.20GHz, 16GB of RAM, and Linux operating system 5.15.0-84-generic Kernel. Latency is calculated as the average of 400 measurements for each framework.

Fig. 2: PQWAVE-MHT and Basic PQC-WAVE Latency comparison




Table 4: PQWAVE-MHT and Basic PQC-WAVE performance measurements

	Falcon-512		Falcon-1024	
	Sign	Verify	Sign	Verify
PQWAVE-MHT	0.53	0.039	0.15	0.077
Basic PQC-WAVE	2.89	0.077	6.09	0.29
Acceleration Rate	82%	74%	81%	73%

Table 4 shows detailed performance. On Falcon-512, PQWAVE-MHT shows a performance improvement of 82% in **Sign** and 74% in **Verify**. Similarly, for Falcon-1024, there are 81% and 73% performance improvements in **Sign** and **Verify**. These experimental results show that using PQWAVE-MHT enables PQC migration while reducing computational overhead, enabling reliable communication. The performance improvements for a single BSM imply that more information can be shared with reduced communication delays in V2X.

We implement PQWAVE-MHT using Falcon, complying with the maximum packet size specified in the IEEE 802.11p standard and achieves a maximum latency of 100ms through accelerated operations. To use HW USRP, the Merkle Hash Tree was configured with the most basic structure, and PQWAVE-MHT, composed of 4 BSMs, replaced 4 Falcon operations with 1 Falcon and 7 SHA-256 operations as shown in Equation (1). When conducting experiments with USRP, we can design an optimized Merkle Hash Tree structure that takes latency and processing speed into account. As a result, PQWAVE-MHT shows high computational acceleration in **Sign** and **Verify**. The computational overhead in embedded OBUs, where real-time performance is crucial, can help ensure the stability of V2X communication.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we present the design, and implementation of PQWAVE-MHT. IEEE standard-based WAVE can only migrate to Falcon among PQC-DSA, and the computational overhead in OBU is effectively reduced by using Merkle Hash Tree. Ultimately, we succeeded in accelerating performance by 82% for **Sign** and 74% for **Verify**, and completed PQC migration. PQWAVE-MHT can be expanded to formal verification using Tamarin-prover and research on actual communication using HW such as USRP. In actual communications, PQWAVE-MHT takes into account various factors, including the reliability and noise of communication packets. Vehicles communicating in a V2X environment using HW radio devices must **Verify** the Signatures of vehicles within their radius in real-time. Furthermore, technology to handle this without packet confusion, using techniques like multi-processing, may be necessary. PQWAVE-MHT can also establish time boundaries that take into account packet dropping and replay attacks comprehensively.

PQWAVE-MHT is a cryptographic protocol and its secrecy can be verified using formal verification such as tamarin-prover. Security protocol analysis tool, tamarin-prover is being widely researched [16, 17]. Additionally, attacks such as DoS are a challenge to overcome in wireless network environments. PQWAVE-MHT uses a logical framework to resist replay attacks. By reducing the Falcon operation and replacing it with SHA-256 operation, weak authentication that resists DoS can be used, but DoS can be responded to with the cheaper operation introduced in Seluge [15]. Wireless network security against these malicious attacks must be evaluated by designing a real test-bed.

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